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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Thomas Pendleton, previously convicted of a 
qualifying sex offense, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
2250(a) for traveling in interstate and foreign commerce and 
knowingly failing to register under the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). On appeal, he 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, as well as 
SORNA‟s constitutionality under the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses. We will affirm.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 The one-count indictment in this case charged that 
 
[f]rom on or about January 28, 2008, to on or 
about March 10, 2008, in the State and District 
of Delaware and elsewhere, THOMAS S. 
PENDLETON, defendant herein, a person 
required to register under Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, Title 42, 
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United States Code, Section 16901 et seq. 
(“SORNA”), having traveled in interstate and 
foreign commerce subsequent to his conviction 
for a sex offense, to wit, a conviction on or 
about September 30, 1992, in the state of New 
Jersey, and a conviction on or about October 
16, 2006, in District Court of Kempten, 
Germany, did knowingly fail to register and 
update a registration as required by SORNA, in 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 2250(a). 
 
(R. at 58.) The parties stipulated that Pendleton was convicted 
of the two sex offenses identified in the indictment and agreed 
that he was, therefore, a “sex offender” under SORNA.  
 
 A. Pendleton’s Registration Status 
Pendleton was registered as a sex offender in 
Washington, D.C. in 2005 and for some period of time before 
then, but in an email dated April 29, 2005, he informed 
Yolanda Stokes, the sex offender registry specialist who 
oversaw his registry, that he was moving to Delaware. He 
wrote, 
 
Effective May 1, 2005, I am moving my 
residence from the District of Columbia to the 
State of Delaware. I have already been in 
contact with the Delaware authority confirming 
my responsibilities there. . . . In case you need 
it, my new address is: 202 West 14th Street, 
Wilmington . . . 19801 [the “Wilmington 
Address”]. My cell phone remains unchanged . . 
. . 
 
 (Id. at 237-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Stokes 
then closed her file on Pendleton, contacted the Delaware 
authorities, and sent them information regarding him. In early 
2008 and again at the time of trial in April of 2009, an officer 
with the Delaware State Police Sex Offender Apprehension 
and Registration Unit searched Delaware records and 
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determined that Pendleton never registered as a sex offender 
there.   
 
 B. Pendleton’s Claims of Delaware Residence 
 On May 4, 2005, Pendleton applied for a driver‟s 
license from the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles. He 
gave the Wilmington Address as his address and signed a 
statement in which he certified, 
 
under penalty of perjury, that the information on 
this application is true and correct, to the best of 
my knowledge, and that I am a bona fide 
resident of Delaware. . . . I understand that all 
convicted sex offenders must register with the 
Delaware State Police within seven days of 
coming into the state as explained on this form. 
 
(Id. at 251.) Pendleton also used the Wilmington Address 
when he filled out and signed a voter registration form at the 
Division of Motor Vehicles on which he stated that he was “a 
permanent resident of the State of Delaware at the address 
given above [the Wilmington Address].” (Id. at 249.) 
 
 Pendleton listed the Wilmington Address as both his 
mailing address and permanent address in a passport 
application dated October 5, 2005. On October 2, 2006, he 
again applied for a passport, with his mailing address in 
Kempten, Germany and the Wilmington Address as his 
permanent address. In a third passport application on February 
29, 2008, within the time period alleged in the indictment, he 
listed the Wilmington Address as his current and permanent 
address.  
 
 Pendleton went to Germany in November of 2005 and 
was convicted of a sex offense there on October 16, 2006. 
After he served his prison sentence for that offense, he was 
deported to the United States, and he arrived at JFK Airport 
on January 21, 2008. William McAlpin, an agent with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, interviewed him 
upon his arrival at JFK. Pendleton listed the Wilmington 
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Address on his customs declaration form and told McAlpin 
that “he was residing” there and planned to go there after 
spending some time visiting friends in New York City. (Id. at 
254-55.) He also told McAlpin that the Wilmington Address 
“was an apartment within a home owned by one Richard 
Bayard.” (Id. at 257.) Pendleton then sent an email to Mr. 
Bayard to let him know that he gave the address to customs 
officials when he came through the airport, and that “a strange 
call might come about me. I explained that it was your home 
and did not correct his impression that I rented a room from 
you.” (Id. at 300.)   
 
 Mr. Bayard owned the single-family home at the 
Wilmington Address.  His adult daughter, Kate Bayard, lived 
there for most of her life with her family and has lived there 
alone since 2006. Ms. Bayard testified that Pendleton “was 
friendly with [her] parents,” but she does not remember 
meeting him. (Id. at 263.) As far as she knows, Pendleton did 
not have a key to the house, never stayed there overnight or 
asked to do so, and did not come in the house. Ms. Bayard did 
not know that Pendleton used her address to obtain a driver‟s 
license, apply for a passport, or register to vote. 
 
At some point between 2002 and 2006, Pendleton 
asked Mr. Bayard to hold his mail while he was traveling. He 
picked up his mail once, and then the Bayards “didn‟t hear 
from him for a number of years.” (Id. at 265.) In 2008, 
Pendleton contacted Mr. Bayard to pick up his mail, and Ms. 
Bayard arranged to leave the mail in the mailbox in front of 
the house. Deputy United States Marshal William David had 
been investigating Pendleton‟s compliance with SORNA and 
made arrangements with Ms. Bayard for Pendleton‟s mail to 
be in the mailbox at the Wilmington Address on the afternoon 
of March 10, 2008.  
 
David went to the Wilmington Address on the 
prearranged day and approached Pendleton, who had checked 
the mailbox and was standing on a nearby street corner. After 
David identified himself, he asked Pendleton for 
identification, and Pendleton produced a Delaware driver‟s 
license that was issued on May 13, 2005 with the Wilmington 
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Address on it. When David asked, Pendleton said that he lived 
at the Wilmington Address but “had lost his key and was 
waiting for the other occupant to get home to let him in.” (Id. 
at 283.) Pendleton also showed David his passport and a 
membership card for Hostelling International, which had the 
Wilmington Address on it. Pendleton said he had just come 
from the library in Wilmington but was staying at a hostel in 
Philadelphia because he “had business” there. (Id. at 284.) A 
receipt showed that he paid to stay at the hostel in 
Philadelphia from March 7 to 11, 2008. The hostel later sent 
his belongings to the United States Marshal‟s Service, and his 
name and the Wilmington Address were written on a luggage 
tag on one of those items.   
 
David arrested Pendleton, read him his rights, and told 
him that he was charged with a violation of § 2250 for failure 
to register as a sex offender. Pendleton first denied being a 
sex offender and then said that he was a sex offender but was 
not required to register. After he was arrested, the government 
executed a search warrant on an email account that he used. 
Emails that he sent and received in late January of 2008, after 
he was deported from Germany to the United States, show 
that he researched sex offender registration requirements in 
Delaware and correctly concluded that at that time he was not 
required to register under Delaware law.   
 
C. Pendleton’s Travels in Early 2008 
 Based on his examination of Pendleton‟s emails, travel 
documents, and other items, David concluded that after 
Pendleton arrived at JFK on January 21, 2008, he stayed in 
New York for about five days and then traveled to 
Philadelphia on or about January 26th. On February 1st, he 
traveled to Delaware, and left for Washington, D.C. on or 
about February 4th. According to David‟s testimony and 
Amtrak tickets in Pendleton‟s name, Pendleton traveled 
starting on February 9th from Washington, D.C. to Chicago; 
starting on February 12th from Chicago to Emeryville, 
California; starting on February 26th from Los Angeles to 
Chicago; and starting on March 2nd from Chicago to 
Washington, D.C. On March 7th, he traveled to Philadelphia, 
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and then on March 10th, he traveled to Wilmington and was 
arrested. Pendleton had a one-way airplane ticket to travel on 
March 12, 2008 from JFK to Prague, Czech Republic. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742. Our review of the Court‟s denial of 
Pendleton‟s motion for judgment of acquittal, its construction 
of SORNA, and its conclusion that SORNA is constitutional 
is plenary. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, which included SORNA,
1
 “was enacted to close the 
loopholes in previous sex offender registration legislation and 
to standardize registration across the states.” United States v. 
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2010). In response to 
previous legislation, by 1996 every state and the District of 
Columbia had mandatory sex offender registration laws, but 
“SORNA creates a national sex offender registry with the 
goal of eliminating inconsistencies among state laws.” Id. 
                                                 
1
 Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006 was itself named the “Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act” (SORNA), and both 42 
U.S.C. § 16913, which contains the sex offender registration 
requirement, and 18 U.S.C. § 2250, which contains the 
criminal enforcement provision under which Pendleton was 
convicted, were enacted through Title I of that Act. Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-248, §§ 101, 113, 141, 120 Stat. 587, 590, 593-94, 601-
02 (2006).  
As defined by statute, “SORNA” thus includes both §§ 
16913 and 2250. In United States v. Shenandoah, we upheld 
the constitutionality of “SORNA” under the Commerce 
Clause, but did not specifically address § 16913. See United 
States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2010). 
We will do so here. 
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When Congress enacted SORNA, it was particularly 
concerned about the transient nature of many sex offenders 
and did not want to lose track of sex offenders when they 
moved from state to state. United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 
709, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2009). Recognizing this, the Eighth 
Circuit “reject[ed] the suggestion that a savvy sex offender 
can move to a different city and avoid having to update his 
SORNA registration by sleeping in a different shelter or other 
location every night.” United States v. Voice, 622 F.3d 870, 
875 (8th Cir. 2010). Given Pendleton‟s extensive travel, the 
government argues that a similar concern regarding transience 
is present in this case. 
 
Under the relevant provision of 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a), 
“[a] sex offender shall register, and keep the registration 
current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where 
the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a 
student.” A “jurisdiction” is, among other things, “[a] State.” 
42 U.S.C. § 16911(10)(A). “The term „resides‟ means, with 
respect to an individual, the location of the individual‟s home 
or other place where the individual habitually lives.” 42 
U.S.C. § 16911(13). A sex offender must “appear in person” 
in at least one of the applicable jurisdictions “not later than 3 
business days after each change of name, residence, 
employment, or student status . . . and inform that jurisdiction 
of all changes in the information required for that offender in 
the sex offender registry.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c).  
 
Pendleton was convicted not under § 16913, which 
does not have an enforcement provision, but under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250(a), which provides that a person commits a crime 
when he or she “(1) is required to register under the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act; (2) . . . (B) travels 
in interstate or foreign commerce . . . ; and (3) knowingly fails 
to register or update a registration as required by the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act.” In other words, 
“[o]nce a person becomes subject to SORNA‟s registration 
requirements . . . that person can be convicted under § 2250 if 
he thereafter travels and then fails to register.” Carr v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010).  
Pendleton does not dispute on appeal that he was a sex 
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offender under § 16913, that he traveled in interstate and 
foreign commerce after those offenses and during the time 
period alleged in the indictment, and that he knowingly did 
not register as a sex offender in Delaware. Rather, he 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he “reside[d]” 
in Delaware and was required to register there. He also argues 
that he did not have fair notice of a requirement to register in 
Delaware, which failure he claims violates the Due Process 
Clause, and that § 16913 exceeds Congress‟s power under the 
Commerce Clause.
2
   
 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
As we noted above, our review of the District Court‟s 
construction of SORNA and denial of Pendleton‟s Rule 29 
motion is plenary. We apply, however, a highly deferential 
standard of review to the jury‟s verdict.  
 
We must sustain the verdict if there is 
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, to uphold the 
jury‟s decision. We do not weigh evidence or 
determine the credibility of witnesses in making 
this determination. In making our review we 
examine the totality of the evidence, both direct 
and circumstantial. We must credit all available 
inferences in favor of the government. 
 
United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(internal quotation marks, punctuation, and citations omitted). 
We will “sustain the verdict unless it is clear that no rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e will only find the 
evidence insufficient when the prosecution‟s failure is clear.” 
                                                 
2
 Pendleton also contends that Congress exceeded its 
Commerce Clause power in enacting § 2250, but recognizes 
that we upheld the constitutionality of § 2250 in Shenandoah. 
He filed a supplemental brief arguing that SORNA violates 
the Tenth Amendment, but did not raise that issue in his 
opening brief and it is, therefore, waived. 
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United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted).   
 
As relevant to the issues before us on appeal, 
Pendleton argued to the District Court that the government 
failed to prove that he resided in any relevant jurisdiction 
during the period identified in the indictment. The Court 
noted that at trial the government proceeded on the theory that 
Pendleton resided in Delaware. The government sought to 
prove this by showing that he used the Wilmington Address 
as a “mail drop” and that he repeatedly claimed to reside 
there. (R. at 29.)  
 
The District Court assumed but did not decide that 
Pendleton did not habitually live at the Wilmington Address. 
The Court “consider[ed]” guidelines that the Attorney 
General issued several months after Pendleton‟s arrest and 
found that the “guidelines seem to imply that . . . a mail drop 
or a location that Pendleton identifies as his home address, is 
one of the places where a sex offender is required to register 
under SORNA.” (Id. at 35-36.) The Court held that the 
Wilmington Address was Pendleton‟s “home” under SORNA 
because he “not only used [that address] as a mail drop, but 
also listed the address as his legal residence on a number of 
occasions and for a number of purposes between 2005 and 
2008.” (Id. at 36; see also id. at 37 n.3.) Pendleton argues that 
he resided in a jurisdiction under SORNA only if he 
“habitually live[d]” there and that the Court violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause when it considered the Attorney General‟s 
guidelines in his case.  
 
Under SORNA, “[t]he term „resides‟ means, with 
respect to an individual, the location of the individual‟s home 
or other place where the individual habitually lives.” 42 
U.S.C. § 16911(13) (emphasis added). Because Congress 
used the phrase “or other,” Pendleton contends that “home” is 
at least partially defined as a place where a sex offender 
“habitually lives.” He claims that an address that is solely a 
mail drop cannot be where a person resides because one does 
not habitually live at a mail drop. It is not necessary for us to 
reach this issue regarding the interim rule, however, because 
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Pendleton stated numerous times – including during the time 
period alleged in the indictment – that he actually lived at the 
Wilmington Address, not only that it was his mailing address. 
A rational trier of fact could have concluded from those 
statements that Pendleton “habitually live[d]” at the 
Wilmington Address.  
 
 Pendleton contends that, given Ms. Bayard‟s testimony 
that he had never been inside or stayed overnight at the 
Wilmington Address, the jury could not have found that he 
habitually lived at the Wilmington Address.  The jury, 
however, was free to disregard her testimony. Pendleton 
claimed many times over a number of years and during the 
period alleged in the indictment – perhaps most notably to the 
Deputy United States Marshal who arrested him outside that 
address – that he actually lived at the Wilmington Address. A 
rational trier of fact could have taken him at his word and 
found that he habitually lived there at some point from 
January 28 to March 10, 2008.
3
   
 
 Pendleton also argues that a sex offender does not 
reside or habitually live somewhere until he or she has been in 
that location for three business days, but SORNA does not 
contain such a limitation. SORNA requires a sex offender to 
“appear in person” in an applicable jurisdiction, including 
where he or she resides, “not later than 3 business days after 
                                                 
3
 In the alternative, Pendleton argues “that the 
government had not met its burden on the „resides‟ element, 
because it had not proved that Mr. Pendleton maintained a 
dwelling place in the State of Delaware.” (Appellant‟s Br. at 
2.) But SORNA does not require a sex offender to register 
where he or she “maintain[s] a dwelling place.”  SORNA, 
rather, mandates that a sex offender register “in each 
jurisdiction where the offender resides,” 42 U.S.C. § 
16913(a), which is where he has his “home or other place 
where [he] habitually lives,” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(13).  There 
was sufficient evidence not only for a rational juror to 
conclude that Pendleton resided at the Wilmington Address 
but also that he “habitually live[d]” somewhere in Delaware 
and he was, therefore, required to register in that jurisdiction.  
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each change of . . . residence . . . and inform that jurisdiction 
of all changes in the information required for that offender in 
the sex offender registry.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). SORNA‟s 
three-day time period prescribed the time by which Pendleton 
was required to register in Delaware, not how long he was 
required to stay without interruption in Delaware before it 
became the place where he “habitually live[d].” See 
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 157.  
 
 We will affirm the District Court‟s conclusion that 
sufficient evidence supported the conviction. 
 
 B. Due Process and Fair Notice 
 There is no dispute that at the time Pendleton was 
arrested, he was not required to register as a sex offender 
under Delaware law. SORNA imposes a federal requirement 
that “[a] sex offender shall register, and keep the registration 
current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides,” 
which in this case was Delaware. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) 
(emphasis added). Pendleton argues that as applied to him, 
SORNA violates the Due Process Clause because he did not 
have fair notice that federal law required him to register in 
Delaware, even though Delaware law did not.   
 
 “The Supreme Court has explained that a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if it „fails to provide a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement.‟” Interactive Media Entm’t & 
Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Attorney General, 580 F.3d 113, 116 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285, 304 (2008)). Pendleton contends that SORNA fails the 
“fair notice” element of this test in his case because it “directs 
an individual to register in the sex offender registry of a 
jurisdiction which does not require that he register as a sex 
offender.” (Appellant‟s Br. at 32.)  He argues that a person of 
ordinary intelligence would not know that federal law 
required him to do so when Delaware law did not.   
 
 Federal law, however, often imposes requirements or 
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restrictions that are different from state law. For example, 
California and other states “authorize the use of marijuana for 
medicinal purposes,” but federal law prohibits that activity. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5, 7-8 (2005). Medicinal 
marijuana users in California and elsewhere could be using 
marijuana legally under state law, but still be vulnerable to 
federal prosecution. Similarly, Pendleton was not required to 
register under Delaware law, but was still vulnerable to 
federal prosecution for failing to register. 
 
In Shenandoah, moreover, the defendant argued that 
SORNA did not apply to him because New York and 
Pennsylvania, the two states in which the government alleged 
that Shenandoah was required to register, had not yet 
implemented SORNA. We rejected that argument and 
concluded that “an independent and federally enforceable 
duty is placed on sex offenders to register.” Shenandoah, 595 
F.3d at 157. Even if New York and Pennsylvania never 
implemented SORNA, such “failure to implement a federal 
law . . . [would] not give sex offenders a reason to disregard 
their federal obligation to update their state registrations.” Id. 
Instead, “[w]hen a sex offender travels in interstate commerce 
and disobeys the federal command to keep his or her 
registration current, as required by SORNA, he or she is 
subject to prosecution.” Id.; see also United States v. Guzman, 
591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (“SORNA creates a federal 
duty to register with the relevant existing state registries 
regardless of state implementation of the specific additional 
requirements of SORNA.”).  
 
Put simply, Pendleton‟s federal duty to register under 
SORNA was not dependent upon his duty to register under 
Delaware law. A person of ordinary intelligence would not 
assume that as long as he or she complied with state law on a 
particular issue, there would be no risk of running afoul of 
federal law. We therefore reject Pendleton‟s argument as to 
fair notice under the Due Process Clause. 
 
 
 C. Commerce Clause 
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 Although recognizing that in Shenandoah we upheld 
the constitutionality of § 2250 under the Commerce Clause, 
Pendleton argues that (1) § 16913 is an unconstitutional 
exercise of Congress‟s Commerce Clause power and (2) 
because lack of compliance with § 16913 is a necessary 
element of § 2250, § 2250 is also unconstitutional.  
 
“It has been long established Congress may forbid or 
punish use of interstate commerce „as an agency to promote 
immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the 
people of other states from the state of origin.‟” United States 
v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brooks v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925)), quoted in 
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 161. Furthermore, “„the authority of 
Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free 
from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently 
sustained, and is no longer open to question.‟” Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) 
(quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 
(1917)), quoted in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 
(1995).     
 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court explained that it had 
 
identified three broad categories of activity that 
Congress may regulate under its commerce 
power. First, Congress may regulate the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce. Second, 
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even 
though the threat may come only from intrastate 
activities. Finally, Congress‟ commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
 
514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted). In Shenandoah, we 
held that SORNA “derives its authority from each prong of 
Lopez, and most specifically” the first and second Lopez 
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prongs. 595 F.3d at 161. When a sex offender travels between 
states, he or she is a person in interstate commerce who 
travels via the use of the channels of interstate commerce. See 
id.  
 
 Pendleton claims that Shenandoah does not foreclose 
his Commerce Clause challenge because in Shenandoah we 
did not analyze the constitutionality of § 16913 separately 
from § 2250.  He contends that § 16913 is beyond the bounds 
of the Commerce Clause because it requires registration from 
all sex offenders, not just those who travel in interstate 
commerce. The government argues that § 16913 is a valid 
exercise of Congress‟s Commerce Clause power through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  
 
Congress has the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the 
powers that it has under, inter alia, the Commerce Clause. 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Discussing the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause many years ago, the Supreme 
Court wrote, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 421 (1819). Discussing that Clause more recently, 
the Supreme Court stated that “the relevant inquiry is simply 
„whether the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the 
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power‟ or 
under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the 
authority to implement.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment)) (upholding through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause a “federal civil-commitment 
statute [that] authorizes the Department of Justice to detain a 
mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the 
date the prisoner would otherwise be released,” id. at 1954) 
(further internal quotation marks omitted); see also Raich, 
545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Where necessary to 
make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress 
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not 
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themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.”). 
 
In upholding § 16913 under the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Second Circuit noted 
that (1) “§ 16913 does not exist in a vacuum” but rather 
complements § 2250; (2) by the time SORNA was enacted, 
every state had a sex offender registry, so SORNA was not 
solely focused on creating a registry; and (3) the enforcement 
provision in § 2250(a) would not affect a sex offender 
convicted in state court who did not travel between states or 
countries. Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90-91. “Congress‟s goal was 
not simply to require sex offenders to register or to penalize 
the failure to do so,” but instead “to make sure sex offenders 
could not avoid all registration requirements just by moving to 
another state.” Id. at 91. The court in Guzman concluded that  
 
[r]equiring sex offenders to update their 
registrations due to intrastate changes of address 
or employment status is a perfectly logical way 
to help ensure that states will more effectively 
be able to track sex offenders when they do 
cross state lines. To the extent that § 16913 
regulates solely intrastate activity, its means „are 
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a 
legitimate end under the commerce power,‟ and 
therefore proper.  
 
Id. (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment)) (further internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that § 2250 and § 16913 
“are clearly complementary: without § 2250, § 16913 lacks 
federal criminal enforcement, and without § 16913, § 2250 
has no substance.” United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 
259 (5th Cir. 2009). That court also recognized that SORNA 
was focused “on the problem of sex offenders escaping their 
registration requirements through interstate travel.” Id. The 
court in Whaley  
conclude[d] that requiring sex offenders to 
register both before and after they travel in 
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interstate commerce – which clearly facilitates 
monitoring those movements and which has a 
minimal practical impact on intrastate sex 
offenders (who cannot be punished under 
federal law for failure to register unless and 
until they travel in interstate commerce) – is 
„reasonably adapted‟ to the goal of ensuring that 
sex offenders register and update previous 
registrations when moving among jurisdictions. 
 
Id. at 261 (footnote omitted). 
Relying on M’Culloch and Justice Scalia‟s concurrence 
in Raich, the Eighth Circuit observed that 
 
[a] narrow discussion which only analyzes § 
16913 under the three categories of Lopez casts 
doubt on the constitutionality of § 16913. . . . 
However, an analysis of § 16913 under the 
broad authority granted to Congress through 
both the commerce clause and the enabling 
necessary and proper clause reveals the statute 
is constitutionally authorized. 
 
Howell, 552 F.3d at 715, quoted in United States v. Vasquez, 
611 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the 
constitutionality of § 16913). The court in Howell determined 
that “SORNA was intended to regulate the interstate 
movement of sex offenders” and that § 16913 was “a 
reasonable means to track those offenders if they move across 
state lines.” Id. at 717; see also Vasquez, 611 F.3d at 331; 
United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“Section 16913 is reasonably adapted to the attainment 
of a legitimate end under the commerce clause. The 
requirement that sex offenders register under § 16913 is 
necessary to track those offenders who move from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction.”). Pendleton cites, and we have found, no 
court of appeals that supports his argument that § 16913 is 
unconstitutional. 
The reasoning in the cases we have discussed above is 
congruous with our decision in Shenandoah, and we join our 
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sister courts of appeals in holding that § 16913 “is a law made 
in pursuance of the constitution,” M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 424, 
because it is “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” Congress‟s power under the Commerce Clause, 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
